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The Relevance of Water "Ownership"
To Water Markets and Other Issues
Barton H. Thompson, Jr.
I. ESMIDAUCMHY
A. SMIBM212/
Courts have given varying answers to the abstract question of who 'owns" the water that
is distributed by a water organization. In the case of mutual water companies, for example,
most courts have held that the shareholders are the "real owners" of the water rights (even
though the mutual might hold "naked title" to the rights). Some courts, however, have held that
the mutual owns the rights, typically in trust for its shareholders; Colorado has adopted a‘mix
of views. In the case of irrigation and other water districts, most courts have held that the
district owns the water rights in trust for its landowners, although several courts have concluded
that the landowners actually own the rights.
Abstract pronouncements on "ownership," however, can be highly misleading when
applied to specific questions. Today, perhaps the most important question in which "ownership"
plays a role is who, if anyone, has the right to transfer or market the water that is distributed
to individual members of a water organization. Answers to this question are wildly varying—
depending on the state, the type of organization involved, its articles and by-laws, and whether
one is discussing "internal transfers" within the organization or "external transfers" to land or
users outside the organization.
In most states, shareholders in a mutual water company can engage in both internal and
external transfers, so long as the transfers do not injure other water users and are not
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inconsistent with the mutual's by-laws or regulations. Law regarding transfers by landowners
in irrigation or other water districts is quite sparse. What law exists, however, suggests that
landowners will often be able to engage in internal transfers (at least where the district's board
has authorized such transfers), but not external transfers. Districts themselves will often be able
to engage in transfers, but typically only on restricted terms and in limited settings.
Given the growing importance of water markets, state legislatures should consider
clarifying the rights of water organizations and their members to engage in transfers. Currently
relevant statutory and judicial law developed decades ago before market issues were prominent
and, as a result, the law is often vague, confusing, and even internally inconsistent. Reform
efforts have already begun in California, where Congress has authorized landowners in the
Central Valley Project to engage in direct external transfers, and where the state legislature is
considering legislation that would give a similar right to members of all water organizations
statewide.
As explained in Part IV, "ownership" issues can also be relevant to a wide variety of
other questions. On most issues, courts have taken a flexible approach, awarding "ownership"
interests to both the water organization and its members as needed. Courts have generally
awarded interests to the members when needed to protect against arbitrary organizational
decisions or outside attacks. Yet, courts have recognized organizational interests in disputes




Few articles or books deal either comprehensively or well with ownership questions. The
following references address the question at least in passing.
1.	 General references
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81
CALIF. L. Ray. 671 (1993)
• discusses organizational roles in water markets and suggests a variety of
possible reforms
John H. Davidson, Distribution and Storage Organizations, in 3 WATERS AND WATER
Mows 467 (1991 ed.)
Note, Desert Survival: The Evolving Western Irrigation District, 1982 Aarz. ST. L.J.
377, 409-15
Frank J. Trelease, Reclamation Water Rights, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 464, 475-81
(1960)
• focuses on ownership of federal reclamation water
2.	 State-specific references
John H. Davidson, South Dakota's Water Districts—An Introduction, 36 S. DAIL L. REV.
500, 512-17 (1991)
• includes discussion of law outside South Dakota
Note, The Efficient Use of Utah's Irrigation Water: Increased Transferability of Water
Rights, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 158, 161-67
A Survey of Colorado Water Law, 47 DENVER L.J. 226, 260-61 (1970)
Theodore W. Russell, Mutual Water Companies in California, 12S. Ca. L. REV. 155,
157-82 (1939)
FORMAL_MWLalP
As discussed in Part III, asking who "owns" an organization's water can be highly
misleading unless you also provide the context for the question. "Ownership" can mean
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different things for different purposes. Yet many state courts have adopted general positions on
who "owns' the water that typically provide the courts with at least a starting point for their
analysis of more specific questions. These starting views vary according to what type of water
organization is involved.
A. Mutual Water Companies
Courts have spent the most time examining the question of who owns the water rights
in a mutual water company. States have adopted different answers, although there may be little
practical consequence to tnany of the differences.
1. Ihtinalorkttrauhanduildossalburatsr
Most states take the position that a mutual's shareholders are the "real owners" of the
water rights (although the mutual might hold "naked title" to the rights). See, e.g., Slosser v.
Salt River Valley Canal Co., 7 Ariz. 376, 65 P. 332, 338-39 (1901); Snow v. Abalos, 18 N.M.
681, 140 P. 1044, 104849 (1914) (community ditch); Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 96 Utah
88, 80 P.2d 930, 936 (1938); qt Gasser v. Garden Water Co., 81 Idaho 421, 346 P.24 592,
594 (1959) (suggesting without explicitly holding that shareholders own the water).
In a few states such as Arizona and Washington, this conclusion is dictated by the local
law that no one can appropriate water to irrigate land that they do not own or possess. In these
states, water rights must be appurtenant and cannot be held in gross. See Slosser, supra;
Tattersfield v. Putnam, 45 Ariz. 156, 41 P.2d 228, 234 (1935); Avery v. Johnson, 59 Wash.
332, 109 P. 1028, 1029 (1910).
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2. ThtmlitnaLownsiht nierittrust
California courts have held that mutuals are the legal owners of their water rights, but
that the mutuals hold the water rights in trust for their shareholders who are the "beneficial
owners" of the water rights. See, e.g., Consolidated People's Ditch Co. v. Foothill Ditch Co.,
205 Cal. 54, 269 P. 915, 920 (1928). The California courts have emphasized, however, that
the shareholders' beneficial right is a limited one: a shared right to receive water through the
mutual's facilities. Id. at 920.
3. The mutual owns the water
The South Dakota Supreme Court has held that mutuals own their water rights "the same
as any other property, subject, however, to possible public regulation." Butte County v.
Lovinger, 64 S.D. 209, 266 N.W. 127 (1936).
4. Colorado law
Colorado courts have described the relative ownership rights of mutuals and their
shareholders in various ways over time. The courts have typically espoused the majority view
that, although a mutual might have naked title to a water right, its shareholders are the actual
owners. In the phrase typically used by the Colorado courts, a shareholder's stock certification
is merely a "muniment of title" to the water. See Nelson v. Lake Canal Co., 644 P.2d 55
(Colo. Ct. App. 1981); Jacobucci v. District Court, 189 Colo. 380, 541 P.2d 667, 672 (1975);
Billings Ditch Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 127 Colo. 69, 253 P.24 1058, 1060 (1953).
In a few cases, however, Colorado courts have alternatively suggested that mutuals own
5
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water rights in trust for their shareholders. See, e.g., Stuart v. Davis, 25 Colo. App. 568, 139
P. 577 (1914).
Finally, in at least one case, the Colorado Supreme Court has emphasized that neither
a mutual nor a shareholder by itself is an "appropriator in the strict sense of the term.* Instead,
the appropriative right is dependent on the "joint and practically concurrent acts" of diverting
and then using the water. Board of County Comm'rs v. Rocky Mountain Water Co., 102 Cob.
351, 79 P.2d 373 (1938).
B. krintbILlinhethigthilititaibteraittistS
Courts have had less opportunity to address who owns the water rights distributed by
irrigation and other agricultural water districts. Here again courts have diverged in their answer.
1. Theiniadtairanikthatemuiattnightsa
Most state courts have held that districts own the rights to the water they distribute, but
that they hold the rights in trust for their members and to fulfill their statutory purposes. Thus
courts often speak of district property owners as the "beneficial and equitable owners" of the
water rights. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Milner Low Lift hr. Dist., 85 Idaho 528, 381 P.2d 440,
449 (1963); Madera hr. Dist. v. All Persons, 47 Cal. 2d 681, 306 P.2d 886, 892-93 (1957),
revid on other ground, 357 U.S. 275 (1958); Merchants' Nat'l Batik v. Escondido W. Dist.,
144 Cal. 329, 77 P. 937, 939 (1904).
Some state authorizing statutes have codified this position by providing that the title to
water rights is vested in the district, in trust for the district purposes. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. (4 37-41-115 & 37-42-113(1).
2.	 Members own the water rights
As noted earlier, a few states hold that no one can appropriate irrigation water unless
they own or possess the land upon which they plan to use the water. See p. 4 supra. In these
states, the members of irrigation districts by necessity must own the water rights.
The Washington Supreme Court has thus held that the members of a special water district
are the actual owners of the water rights, and enjoy vested rights to the water. See State Dept.
of Ecology v. Acquavella, 100 Wash. 2d 651, 674 P.2d 160, 163 (1983). At the same time,
however, the Washington court has emphasized that the water districts act much Ulm a "trustee"
of these rights and thus can represent their members' interests as against third parties. In
practice, therefore, the Washington view might not differ significantly from the majority view.
C. fitflanatiaWalsr
The Supreme Court has twice held that recipients of federal reclamation water own the
right to the water. According to the Court, the federal government holds no water right but is
"simply a carrier and distributor of the water." See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 614
(1945); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 94-95 (1937).
Lower courts have not taken this language literally, but have assumed that the Court was
speaking only to the narrow question of the federal government's rights as against its water
recipients. Thus, both before and after the Nebraska and Ickes cases, federal and state courts
have held that the United States does hold an interest in the water as against third parties. See,
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e.g., Ide v. United States, 263 U.S. 497, 506 (1924); United States v. Tilley, 124 F.2d 850 (8th
Cir. 1941), an. denied, 316 U.S. 691 (1942); Bean v. United States, 143 Ct. Cl. 363, 163 F.
	 rTh
Supp. 838, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 906 (1958); Jensen v. Dept. of Ecology, 102 Wash. 2d 109,
685 P.2d 1068 (1984).
D. CitillUELtbUttittningfal
Only a few courts have addressed the question of who owns the water rights of a
commercial water distributor—the distributor or its customers? The prevailing view appears to
be that the distributor owns the water right. See, e.g., Willis v. Neches Canal Co., 16 S.W.24
266 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929).
Once again, however, commercial water distributors arguably cannot own appropriative
rights in those states that require appropriators to own the land they are irrigating. Thus, the
Arizona Supreme Court has held that a mutual that distributes water to non-shareholders for a
	 pm
fee does not own those water rights but acts as a "public agency" and must distribute water
"with due regard to priority of appropriation." Slosser v. Salt River Valley Canal Co., 7 Ariz.
376, 65 P. 332, 338-39 (1901).
HI. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT
The general views of a court regarding "ownership" of water rights can be quite
misleading when applied to specific questions without any sense of context. For a variety of
reasons, it is important to analyze each question individually and not fall back on the simplistic
talisman of "ownership." See, e.g., Guy v. Donald, 203 U.S. 399 (1906) (warning of the
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danger of "being led by a technical definition to apply a certain name, and then to deduce
consequences which have no relation to the grounds on which the name was applied"); Jacobucci
v. District Court, 189 Colo. 380, 541 P.24 667, 673 (1975) (warning against "the use of
simplistic, categorical definitions").
A. "Ownership" Has Multiple Meanings
As we are all taught in first-year property, ownership consists of a bundle of rights. A
court's conclusion that a mutual shareholder "owns" water rights for one purpose, therefore,
does not necessarily mean that the shareholder "owns" the • water rights for a different purpose.
B. Courts Often Change Their Views Regarding "Ownership" Depending on the
QatZ1
Partly for this reason, state courts have never been fully consistent in their conclusions
regarding who "owns" the water rights in any given organization. In a number of early cases,
for example, the Colorado Supreme Court held that mutual shareholders are the actual owners
of the water rights and that their shares are "simply a muniment of title to the water rights,
which are real property." In Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Markham, 106 Colo. 509, 107
P.24 313 (1940), however, Markham had mortgaged his land and accompanying water rights;
the trust deed did not mention Markham's shares in a mutual. When the mortgagor later
foreclosed, it claimed the water rights underlying the shares, citing as support the earlier rulings
of the Colorado courts. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the earlier cases were irrelevant
because they dealt with different issues, and held that the mortgage did not include the water
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rights. Id. at 315.
It is particularly misleading to use opinions concerning the relative rights of an
organization and its members over internal Sues to resolve questions regarding external
relationships, and vice versa. Early courts frequently awarded members of an organization legal
or equitable interests in their water to protect them against arbitrary or discriminatory behavior
by the organization. Courts, however, have frequently emphasized the water interests of the
organization in addressing whether outside parties have any claim over the water or whether
members can transfer their water out of the organization's jurisdiction. See Frank J. Trelease,
Reclamation Water Rights, 32 Roc
C. • "Ownership" Is Often Only Part of the Analysis
Although "ownership" may be relevant to a specific question, it will often constitute only
part of the analysis. Whether a member of a water organization "owns" his or her water rights,
for Sample, might be relevant to whether the member can transfer the water right to a third
party. But even if the member owns the water, the organization might still have the power to
regulate the transfer, or the owner's transfer rights might be contractually limited. Seldom will
'ownership' alone answer specific questions of relevance to water organizations, their members,
and customers.
AITUCAINESLIDIFECIELCINESTIONS
The question of who "owns" the water rights in an organization can be relevant to a
variety of questions. The following is a necessarily brief analysis of a number of the questions
KY Mrs. L. REV. 464, 476 (1960).
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that the courts have addressed.
A. Right to Transfer or Market Water
Perhaps the most important question today is who, if anyone, has a right to transfer an
organizational water right. This question is best broken down into three more specific questions:
(1) Can the member of an organization transfer his water within the organization's
boundaries, either to other land that he owns or to another member?
(2) Can the member transfer his water out of the organization?
(3) Can the organization transfer water without the approval of each affected member?
1.	 Internal transfers by pi embers
In most agricultural water organizations, members enjoy entitlements to specific quantities
or percentages of water. Because of the need for flexibility to meet changing demands and
conditions, members will frequently want to transfer water either between their properties or
among themselves. As explained below, courts have been quite sympathetic to such needs.
a.	 Transfers within mutualn
i. As a general rule, courts have upheld the right of mutual shareholders to transfer
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water internally. In upholding this right, courts have often emphasized that shareholders are
the actual or equitable owners of the water rights. See, e.g., Great Western Sugar Co. v.
Jackson Lake Reservoir & Irr. Co., 681 P.2d 484 (Colo. 1984); Consolidated People's Ditch
Co. v. Foothill Ditch Co., 205 Cal. 54, 269 P. 915, 929 (1928); Hard v. Boise City hr. &
Land Co., 9 Idaho 589, 76 P. 331 (1904); George v. Robison, 23 Utah 79, 63 P. 819, 820
(1901); Cache La Poudre hr. Co. v. Latimer & Weld Reservoir Co., 25 Colo. 144,53 P. 318,
319-20 (1898).
ii. But shareholders cannot transfer their water if the transfer would injure other
shareholders. See, e.g., Great Western Sugar Co., supra; Hard, supra.
in. And mutuals might have a right to condition or even prohibit internal transfers.
The California Civil Code explicitly authorizes mutual water companies to provide in their
articles or by-laws that water is "appurtenant to certain lands" and transferable only with the
land. CAL. CD/. CODE 330.24. Even prior to the passage of this section, however, California
courts held that mutuals could restrict and even outlaw internal transfers. See, e.g., Riverside
Land Co. v. Jarvis, 174 Cal. 316, 163 P. 54 (1917) (decided prior to passage of * 330.24); cf.
Billings Ditch Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 127 Cob. 69, 253 P.2d 1058 (1953) (noting
restrictions on transfers).
Perhaps recognizing the value of internal transfers, however, courts have sometimes gone
out of their way to evade local restrictions. In Locke v. Yorba ht. Co., 35 Ca1.2d 205, 217
P.2d 42$ (1950), for example, a shareholder sold 62 of his 118 acres but reserved all of his
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shares for use on his remaining acreage. The court upheld this action even though the mutuaPs
by-laws explicitly provided that "stock should not be transferable except with the land for which
it was issued" and that "a conveyance of the land should constitute a transfer of the stock
appurtenant thereto." According to the court, the prohibition on off-land transfers was irrelevant
because the water would be used on the shareholder's remaining land; the provision that
conveyances included the water applied only if the shareholder did not provide to the contrary
in the sales agreement. See also Stone v. Imperial Water Co., 173 Cal. 39, 159 P. 164, 166
(1916).
iv. State statutes or law requiring water rights to be appurtenant to particular
parcels of land may pose an obstacle to at least some internal transfers. Concerns have been
raised that the statutes of some states may require mutual water rights to be appurtenant to
particular parcels of land and therefore not transferable. See, e.g., John H. Davidson,




Because irrigation and other water districts are authorized by statute, the first place to
look in determining whether landowners can transfer their water internally is the authorizing
statutes. A number of states expressly permit district boards to authorize intradistrict transfers.
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-158 (irrigation districts); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. {} 541.290
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(water conservancy districts); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS Arm. § 46A-5-24 (irrigation districts);
UTAH Coon ANN. § 17A-2-711 (irrigation districts) (limited to one-year assignments); id.
17A-2-1435(5) (conservancy districts); Wyo. STAT. 41-3-749(a)(v) (conservancy districts).
A few states impose special requirements or limitations on internal transfers, but
otherwise expressly authorize them. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 42-121; N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 73-9-14.
Judicial decisions
In many states, unfortunately, authorizing statutes are silent regarding whether
landowners can transfer water rights internally within a district. Several courts, however, have
indicated that landowners do have the right to engage in internal transfers. See, e.g., Cline v.
McDowell, 132 Colo. 37, 284 P.2d 1056 (1955); knison v. Redfield, 149 Cal. 500, 87 P. 62,
64 (1906).
	 pTh
Inconsistent statutory provisions, of course, would override this general conclusion.
None of these cases, moreover, involved attempts by a landowner to engage in an internal
transfer over the opposition of a district.
2. bittinnifriabLffirilikES
As metropolitan areas have begun looking for additional water, their gaze has naturally
landed on agricultural water users. A major issue today in many parts of the West, therefore,
is whether members of a water organization have the right to sell or transfer their water out of




in most states typically have the right to transfer their water shares so long as other water users
are not injured thereby, but that members of irrigation districts do not have the right absent
enabling legislation.
a. Eatemalitansfinitandmatillinlisiden
i. Colorado courts have expressly recognized the right of shareholders to transfer
their water rights to external users, subject to reasonable regulation by the mutual.
Colorado courts have long held that shareholders have a right to transfer their shares to outside
water users. See, e.g., Wadsworth Ditch Co. v. Brown, 39 Colo. 57, 88 P. 1060(1907); Cache
La Pouchy hr Co. v. Larimer & Weld Reservoir Co., 25 Colo. 144, 53 P. 318 (1898).
Colorado courts have also held that mutuals can impose reasonable restrictions on
external transfers, and that these restrictions are subject only to limited review by the courts.
Thus, in Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Catlin Canal Co., 642 P.2d 501, 508-09 (Colo. 1982), the
Colorado Supreme Court approved a mutual by-law requiring board approval of any external
transfer. In a followup case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the board's refusal to
approve a particular external transfer was subject to judicial review, but only under an
"arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion" standard. Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Catlin Canal
Co., 762 P.2d 1375 (Colo. 1988).
2. The California Supreme Court has held that shareholders do not have the right
to engage in external transfers, at least over the opposition of the mutual. In Consolidated
15
People's Ditch Co. v. Foothill Ditch Co., 205 Cal. 54,269 P. 915 (1928), an irrigation district
bought up shares in a number of mutuals and tried to change both the points of diversion and
the places of use to outside the mutuals' borders. The California Supreme Court held that a
shareholder's right is merely to a supply of water through the mutual's facilities. To permit
unrestricted external transfers, according to the court, could lead to "inextricable discord and
confusion." In this case, however, the mutuals opposed the transfers; whether shareholders can
engage external transfers with the approval of their mutuals is an open question in California.
in. External transfers are generally subject to the same restrictions as other transfers
of water rights, including the "no injury" rule. Courts have repeatedly emphasized that
shareholders cannot engage in external transfers that would injure other appropriators. See, e.g.,
City of Colorado Springs v. Yust, 126 Colo. 289, 249 P.2d 151, 153 (1952); Wadsworth Ditch
Co., supra; Cache La Port& hr. Co., supra, at 320.
iv. State statutes providing for appurtenant water lights may again pose an obstacle
to at least some external transfers. See p. 4 supra.
b.	 External transfers by landowners in irrigation districts
I.	 Statutory provisions
Most state statutes are silent on the question of whether landowners in irrigation or other
water districts can engage in external transfers.
Statutory authorization of internal transfers (which are often limited to particular settings
(Th
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or require board approval), with no mention of external transfers, however, can be read as
implicitly proscribing external transfers by landowners.
II.	 Judicial opinions
Most courts have not dealt with the question whether landowners in irrigation districts
can engage in external transfers. The California Supreme Court, however, has held that
landowners do not have a right to engage in external transfers. See Jenison v. Redfield, 149
Cal. 500, 87 P. 62 (1906) (emphasizing that irrigation districts hold water in trust for use in "the
irrigation of lands within the district"); cf. Madera hr. Dist. v. All Persons, 47 Cal. 681, 306
P.2d 886 (1957), rev'd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 275 (1958) (holding that property owners
who ask for and get excluded from a district cannot taw their share of water from a federal
reclamation project with them).
iii. Disputes surrounding the Middle Rio Grand Conservancy District
Under New Mexico law, landowners within a conservancy district whose water rights
predate the organization of the district hold vested rights to that water. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-
14-47(c). Landowners within the Middle Rio Grand Conservancy District, joined by the state
engineer, have argued that this entitles the landowners to transfer their rights within or outside
the district's borders without the district's approval. See Micha Gisser & Ronald Johnson,
Institutional Restrictions on the Transfer of Water Rights and the Survival of an Agency, in
WATER Mows: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
137, 150-160 (T. Anderson, ed. 1983). The district has strongly disagreed and, to date, the
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appellate courts have not been forced to resolve the dispute.
iv. Stalninniatms
In the last several years, several legislatures have considered the desirability of
authorizing members of water organizations to engage in external transfers.
a. 1922 thliniblisSattaill
In an attempt to expand water markets in California, Congress has recently approved
external transfers by landowners in districts which receive federal reclamation water from the
California Central Valley Project ("CVP"). Under the Reclamation Projects Authorization &
Adjustment Act of 1992, 106 Stat. 4600, any individual receiving CVP water can engage in
direct external transfers. In most cases, external transfers are subject only to limited restrictions
and to circumscribed review and approval by the Secretary of the Interior (and, where
appropriate, to approval by the state water permitting agency). A district can -veto a transfer
only if the transfer involves more than 20 percent of the CVP water received by the district, and
then only on narrow grounds. The Secretary of the Interior and, where relevant, the district
must act on a proposed transfer within 90 days; if a transfer is disapproved, the Secretary or
district must explain why and describe any alternatives that would be approved.
b. Proposed state legislation
The California legislature has also considered authorizing landowners to engage in
external transfers in all irrigation or water districts across the state.
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1. In 1991, California Assemblyman Richard Katz introduced a bill that, in its early
versions, would have given anyone receiving water from a public water organization the right
to sell his or her individual "allocation" to outside users even over the opposition of the
organization. Assembly Bill 2090, 1991-1992 Reg. Sess. § 2 (Cal.). Katz extolled the bill as
"breaking the backs of water districts who are blocking water trades." Agricultural water
organizations vigorously opposed the bill, and it ultimately died in the California Senate, even
though a variety of committee amendments had already weakened it.
2. A similar bill, however, was introduced earlier this year and is under active
consideration. See Assembly Bill 97, 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. (Cal.).
3. External transfers by organizations
The right of the members of an organization to transfer their water raises a correlative
question: can organizations sell or transfer water to outsiders without the approval of those
members to whom the water would otherwise go?
a. ateDiaLltaBarld2LIBBBIRIS
Few courts have considered the transfer rights of mutuals. The Colorado Court of
Appeals, however, has held that mutuals cannot surrender or sell their water without the
approval of their shareholders. Stuart v. Davis, 25 Colo. App. 568, 139 P. 577, 579 (1914).
According to the court, a mutual is bound "by its trust" to deliver water to its shareholders. Id.
at 581. A similar proscription on unilateral transfers by mutuals should apply in all states
recognizing shareholders as either the legal or equitable owners of the underlying water rights.
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b. Externairandersittialgalloulistritis
The right of a district to transfer or sell water to users outside the district is controlled
primarily by statute. Unfortunately, virtually all relevant state statutes were written before
interregional water markets became important. As a result, the statutes are often vague,
confused, or unnecessarily restrictive of the right of an irrigation or water district to engage in
external transfers.
I. atetstalilignibithafiens
Few state statutes proscribe all external transfers. But see WYO. STAT. § 41-3-742(a)(x)
(authorizing sales and leases of water by conservancy districts only for "use within the district").
State statutes, however, often authorize only limited sales or lames of district water or
explicitly proscribe certain sales or leases. Examples of common state legislation include:
(1) Bans on permanent transfers. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-1447(J)
(conservancy districts); Wyo. STAT. § 41-7-815 (1977) (irrigation districts).
(2)Limits on the length of leases. See, e.g., COLO REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-42-135
(twenty years); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-1447(1) (ten years, although court can expand);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-2-711 (five years).
(3)Restriction of transfers to "surplus" water that is not "needed" by district users.
See, e.g.. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 22259,35425; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3742-135;
20
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IDAHO CODE § 43-318; Mora. CODE ANN. §85-7-1911(3); OR. REV. STAT. 545.110;
Tsx. WATER CODE ANN. § 51.173, 51.188, 55.197; UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-2-711.
Procedural hurdles
Several states also place procedural hurdles in the way of external transfers by districts.
Examples include requirements of:
(1)Special district elections. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-43-124 to -125
& 37-42-135; IDAHO CODE 43-318 (election required for sales only if minimum
number of electors request one); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 46A-9-70.
(2)Written permission of district landowners. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-7-
1910(1).
(3)Court approval. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-43-126 & -129.
4.	 Rights of External Users
A related question that has occasionally arisen is whether an external water user who has
been purchasing surplus water from an organization can claim a right to the water that prevents
the organization from reallocating the water. As a matter of water rights (versus contract or
regulation), most courts have held that external users of surplus water do not have any vested
property interest in the water. See, e.g., Yaden v. Gem Irr. Dist., 37 Idaho 300, 216 P. 250
(1923).
States that require appropriators of irrigation water to own or possess the land upon
which the water will be used (see p.4 supra) may reach a different result. Thus, in Slosser v.
Salt River Valley Canal Co., 7 Ariz. 376, 65 P. 332 (1901), the court held that a mutual is
acting as a "public agency" when selling surplus water and must allocate water "with due regard
to priority of appropriation." The agency, therefore, could not shut off an external user in favor
of more recent customers.
B. RightliDtllysaILWater
As various water organizations come under public pressure to reduce or otherwise restrict
their water deliveries, an important question becomes whether organizations can unilaterally
reduce or restrict deliveries without the individual approval of affected members. There are
relevant cases concerning both mutuals and the federal Bureau of Reclamation.
I. MOM
Courts have held that mutuals can adopt reasonable regulations for the delivery of water.
See, e.g., Gasser v. Garden Water Co., 81 Idaho 421, 346 P.2d 592, 594 (1959). However,
courts have also emphasized that shareholders have a "right to use the water" and that mutuals
cannot therefore "defeat or alter" the shareholders' right to receive their water when needed.
See, e.g., Nelson v. Lake Canal Co., 644 P.2d 55 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (shareholder can insist
on 5-day delivery schedule although must pay additional charge); Swasey v. Rocky Point Ditch




One of the more intriguing (and undercited) cases regarding the right of an organization
to cut back deliveries is Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937). There, the federal government
threatened to cut back on the water delivered to the Sunnyside unit of the Yakima project unless
the landowners agreed to pay more for the extra water; the government planned to use the funds
to help pay for a related unit of the project. The landowners claimed that the government could
not cut back on the original quantity because they, and not the government, owned the rights to
the water. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the government was "simply a carrier and
distributor of the water." Id. at 94-95.
C.	 Constitutional Protections
The threat of increasing governmental regulation of water rights, primarily through the
Endangered Species Act and other environmental laws, makes future "talcings" claims all but
inevitable. This in turn raises the question whether water users within an organization have
. constitutionally protected rights for which they can individually claim compensation.
1.	 Protection of "legal" interests
Where state courts recognize the water users as the actual owners of the water rights, the
users should have a clear right to compensation if they can prove a taking. See, e.g., State
Dept. of Ecology v. Acquavella, 100 Wash. 2d 651, 674 P.2d 160, 163 (1983).
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Several courts have also held that the "equitable" interests of landowners in the water
distributed by irrigation districts is a vested property right protected by the Constitution.
Although these cases have typically involved procedural due process claims, their logic should
also extend to takings claims. See, e.g., Dedeke v. Rural Water Dist., 229 Kan. 242, 623 P.2d
1324, 1331 (1981); Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Escondido hr. Dist., 144 Cal. 329, 77 P. 937
(1904).
D. Rights to Return Flow
Mother question of considerable importance today is whether a water organization can
claim the right to recapture and either use or sell the return flow from the water that it
distributes. Here, courts have generally held that the organization does have an interest in the
water (even if inferior or subservient to the interests of its members) and thus can recapture and
use the return flow. See, e.g., Ide v. United States, 263 U.S. 497 (1924) (seepage from federal
reclamation water); Jensen v. Dept. of Ecology, 102 Wash. 2d 109, 685 P.2d 1068 (1984)
(same); Hudspeth County Conservation & Reclamation Dist. v. Robbins, 213 F.2d 425 (5th
Cir.), cat. denied, 348 U.S. 833 (1954) (same); Stevens v. Oakdale hr. Dist., 13 Cal. 2d 343,
90 P.2d 58 (1939) (recapture right of irrigation district).
E. Civil Procedure Issues: Service and Indispensable Parties
A final question of importance in many states is who are the appropriate parties to stream
adjudications or other lawsuits concerning the water rights of an organization. Where an
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adjudication or other action is brought, is it adequate to serve just the organization or must the
n	 individual members also be served? Can the member of a water organization maintain an
adjudication or similar action, or must such an action be brought by the organization?
Relevant cases on this question include:
1. Jacobucci v. District Court, 189 Colo. 380, 541 P.2d 667, 672-73 (1975) —
shareholders are indispensable parties to a an action by a city seeking to condemn a
mutual's water priorities
2. Snow v. Abalos, 18 N.M. 681, 140 P. 1044, 104849 (1944) -- recipient of water
from an acequia can maintain a stream adjudication
3. State Dept. of Ecology v. Acquavella, 100 Wash. 2d 651, 674 P.24 160 (1983) --
members of a large water distributing entity need not be personally served in a complex
stream adjudication, but court reserves question of whether same result would apply to
different facts
F.	 Other Issues
The question of who "owns" the water rights in an organization has also arisen in a
variety of other more limited contexts. The following cases are examples of just some of the
disputes that have raised the "ownership" question.
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"Ownership" has often been an issue in cases where the current members of a water
organization have complained that plans by the organization to expand the membership would
dilute the current members' water rights. Courts have typically protected the current members
in these cases. See, e.g., Laramie River Co. v. Watson, 69 Wyo. 333, 241 P.24 1080, 1092
(1952) (mutual cannot sell more ! shares when water supply is already barely sufficient);
Bradshaw v. Milner Low Lift In. Dist., 85 Idaho 528, 381 P.2d 440 (1963) (prior landowners
in an irrigation district cannot, without their approval, be deprived of the water they need and
have been using); McDermont v. Anaheim Union Water Co., 124 Cal. 112, 56 P. 779 (1899)
(mutual shareholders can sue to enjoin issuance of new stock that will result in reduction of
available supply).
2. Allocation
In Willis v. Neches Canal Co., 16 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929), water users
served by a canal company argued that, under the prior appropriation system, they should
receive their full supply before later users received any water. The court disagreed, deciding
that the canal company was the actual appropriator of the water and that, under TEX. WATER
CODE § 11.039, the water should be distributed on a pro rata basis.
3. Abandonment
What happens if a water organization ceases to exist? Is its water abandoned or can its
members continue to use the water? In St. George City v. Kirkland, 17 Utah 24 292, 409 P.24
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970, 971 (1966), a mutual's charter temporarily lapsed, raising this exact issue. The court held
that the shareholders were the "real owners" of the water and therefore there was no
abandonment if the shareholders continued to use the water.
4. Foreclosure
The question has often arisen as to whether a mortgage of land includes the shares of a
mutual used to supply water for the land. "Ownership" of the underlying water rights has
typically been the deciding factor. Examples include:
1. Comstock v. Olney Springs Drainage Dist., 97 Colo. 416, 50 P.2d 531, 532 (1935)
(water rights belong to shareholder and are therefore liable for assessment by an
irrigation district in which the mutual is located). But see Denver Joint Stock Bank v.
Markham, 106 Colo. 509, 107 P.2d 313 (1940) (concluding that a trust deed did not
cover mutual rights).
2. Yellowstone Valley Co. v. Associated Mortgage Investors, Inc., 88 Mont. 73, 290
P. 255 (1930) (water rights belong to shareholder and thus are subject to foreclosure)
3. Butte County v. Lovinger, 64 S.D. 209, 266 N.W. 127, 130-32 (1936) (water rights
belong to mutual and therefore are not subject to foreclosure)
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5. Taxation
Whether a member of a water organization "owns" water rights will sometimes be
relevant to property taxation. In Beaty v. Board of County Comm trs, 101 Colo. 346,73 P.2d
982, 985 (1937), for example, the Colorado Supreme Court held that mutual shares were
"merely muniments of title" to the underlying water and thus were improvements to the
shareholder's property for property tax purposes.
6. Rate base for public utility
In Board of County Comm'rs v. Rocky Mountain Water Co., 102 Colo. 351, 79 P.2d
373, 375-76 (1938), a commercial company argued that the water it distributed should be
included in its rate base for purposes of rate regulation. The court disagreed, noting that the
company could not by itself appropriate the water.
V. CONCLUSION
Who "owns" the water that is distributed by an organization is an extremely complex
question that depends on a number of issues, including the reason why the question is being
asked. Unfortunately, the law here is not only complex, but often sparse and confused.
State legislatures could help eliminate some of the confusion involved in answering some
of the relevant questions--particularly the question of who has the right to transfer or market
water distributed by an organization. Given the increasing need for flexible water rights and the
growing interest in water markets, the right of organizations and their members to transfer or'
market water rights will be a frequently raised issue in the next decade. Because the law in most
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states is currently unclear, disputes and expensive litigation are all but inevitable. By addressing
flthe issue now, legislatures could both avoid these costly disputes and provide some needed
policy guidance on the normative question of who should have the right to transfer the water.
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